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Die Wohnverhältnisse der aus Usbekistan mobilisierten „Arbeitsarmee“

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Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel analysiert das Leben, die Arbeit, die Arbeitsbedingungen, die Unterbringung an festen Orten und die damit verbundenen Probleme der in den 1990er Jahren aus Usbekistan in den russischen Ural mobilisierten „Arbeitssoldaten“ im Zweiten Weltkrieg.

Schlüsselwörter: „Arbeitssoldaten“, Zweiter Weltkrieg, Arbeit, Ural, Unterkunft, Bedingungen, Versorgung, soziales Leben, Schicksal, Lager.

"Labor Army" mobilized from Uzbekistan residential conditions

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Abstract: In this article World War II the life, work activities, working conditions, their placement in permanent places, and the problems there were analyzed for the "labor soldiers" who were mobilized from Uzbekistan to the Ural regions of Russia in the 1990 s.

Keywords: "labor soldiers", World War II, labor, Urals, accommodation, conditions, supply, social life, fate, camps.

Introduction. By the “top secret” resolution No. 2414 of the State Defense Committee of the former USSR dated October 14, 1942, 350,000 people from Central Asia were mobilized to work in production and industrial enterprises in the Ural regions. Among them, 150,000 people were from Uzbekistan, who were mobilized to hard labor in 111 [1;28-31] industrial and production facilities under the jurisdiction of 19 People's Commissariats in dozens of regions in the Ural regions.

From the point of view of national mobilization, they are divided into brigade, section, squad (column) structural units. Although the activities of the labor army were organized in general equality, the working conditions in production and industrial enterprises were different. They are mainly included in the construction team of the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant [2;56,110] .

The issues of the placement, living conditions, and attitude towards Uzbek "labor soldiers" have not been fully studied in Uzbek historiography.

Analysis of sources. The analysis of this issue involved the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), the State Archives of Socio-Political History of the Russian Federation (RGASPI), the Unified State Archives of the Chelyabinsk Region (OGACHO), the Central Archive of Documents of the New History of the Orenburg Region (TSNIOO), and other sources.

Research methodology. This article was approached from the point of view of historicity. He gave a scientific analysis of the status of the "labor army soldiers", the sources kept in the Russian archives, the place of the labor army soldiers in the socio-economic, especially the military industry of the Urals, their classification and social status.

In historiography, during this period, as in the 1920s and 1930s, many new concepts and terms emerged that required specific classification. In the first half of the 20th century, the use of the term "labor army" and the work in this process acquired a "slavery" character in some sense. During this period, almost all human rights against forced labor were trampled.

Analysis and results. At the end of 1941, labor columns arrived in the Chelyabinsk region as "labor army soldiers" as forced laborers. At that time, all construction battalions made up of people belonging to the German nationality and operating in the IIXK system were reorganized into working columns. No. 779 construction columns of workers were deployed in Chelyabinsk, No. 483, No. 776, No. 793 in Zlatoust, No. 765 in Chebarkol fortress [3; 28, 34].

They are engaged in construction of objects of special construction-assembly department, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, coal industry, mechanical engineering and other people's commissariats. In particular, revitalization of the activities of the metallurgical plant and tube production plant of the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy, the Kirov Plant under the People's Commissariat of Tank Industry, the Chelyabinsk Thermal Power Center under the People's Commissariat of Power Stations, etc. was of great importance. In particular, brigade No. 54, which consisted of Central Asian labor soldiers, was engaged in roofing work during the construction of the Chelyabinsk metallurgical plant.

Some of the Uzbek "labor soldiers" who arrived at the Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk at the end of 1942 began working in the tank industry. The column workers were structurally part of the "Worker Columns Department" and operated as an independent operational unit of the plant [4;77]. This unit of the Kirov plant, based on the staffing table of the worker column structure of June 5, 1942, consisted of four detachments, seven to nine work brigades and leaders. In addition, the column staff included a secretary, a mail carrier, a day shift worker, and in some cases a nurse.

In late 1943 - early 1944, the construction detachment at the Chelyablag Army Labor Camp (MATL), part of the Chelyabinsk Metal Construction Department (*Chelyablag - a labor camp officially established on January 1, 1943, where prisoners were used in construction detachments and operated according to camp regulations*), had 8 columns with a total of 3,000 people, who were included in the category of "first personal composition (staff - in Russian)". 34 of them were management personnel and 42 were employees of the hospital of this unit. Construction detachment No. 6 also fell into this category. The construction detachment of the "second staff" category consisted of three columns, with a total number of about 1,500-2,000 people. In particular, No. 3 - and No. 12 - detachments consisted of two columns each, and No. 2 - construction detachment consisted of three columns.

The brigades of labor soldiers of the Central Asian Military District (CMD) were divided not only by working professions, but also by national category, which was the case for the majority of the Central Asian population. The position of brigade commander (brigadier) was assigned to employees who knew their profession well, had experience in production, and spoke Russian. He directly supervised the implementation of specific tasks and at the end of the working day formalized the percentage of task completion for the brigade.

The placement and registration of workers going to production was supposed to be completed within two to five days, and during this time the enterprise or construction administration was supposed to provide them with bedding, special clothing, and household utensils in accordance with the established norms. However, in practice this was not always done.

It is necessary to emphasize that the labor conditions in the production and construction facilities where the mobilized workers worked were extremely difficult and unfavorable.

In May-July 1943, commissions of the regional health department conducted a study at fourteen industrial enterprises in the Chelyabinsk region and made recommendations for improving working conditions [5;11].

In a number of enterprises, including Kirov Plant No. 701, labor protection regulations were not observed. The lack of an air circulation system, the accumulation of excess gases, and the lighting system that did not meet regulatory requirements led to an increase in the number of illnesses among laborers. Also, in the underground mines of the Kopeiskumyr Trust, problems with the lighting system led to an increase in the number of bruises and injuries among miners.

The arrival of a cool autumn and early winter with cold and strong winds had a strong impact on the condition of Central Asian workers in the Southern Urals. The leadership of the IKHK and the CHMK imposed a number of restrictions on the living and working conditions of workers during the winter of 1943-1944. In particular, on October 17, 1943, Order No. 699 "On measures to prevent freezing" was adopted, according to which the duration of the working hours of workers in the camps in the winter period was determined depending on the weather temperature.

Heavy earthworks, concrete, and loading and unloading required great physical endurance and health from labor soldiers. In addition, there was also a problem with the "language" for the workers, which caused concerns about human life. In one of the documents, we can read the following sentences: "...the lack of language skills among labor soldiers led to injuries and disabilities, especially when reading drawings for working on machines and using technology" [6;127]. Similar situations were observed in almost all industrial enterprises, including the heavy metal foundry shops of the Kirov Plant.

In order to prevent such accidents, since mid-1943, work has been underway to hold talks in the national language with some labor servicemen who were accepted into the "Kopeiskumir" trust in the Chelyabinsk region on instructions and rules for miners. However, since such measures began a little late, by that time many workers had become disabled and even died. Therefore, labor servicemen who did not have

working professions were often involved in work that did not require professional training. In particular, a large part of the labor servicemen at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Plant did not have such qualifications, so they were used as loaders and auxiliary workers [7;19].

During 1943, the Chelyabkomir Trust, managed by the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry, employed 903 workers of Kazakh, Karakalpak, Tajik, and Uzbek ethnic groups.

Working underground required not only knowledge and skills, but also physical strength and health. Due to the lack of fully healthy people among the Central Asian labor army, among the miners, 110-150% of the assigned monthly tasks were few. For example, in February 1944, the labor efficiency of only 6 people working in mine No. 201 of the "Kopeyskkomir" trust was 110-140%, and the labor productivity of all the workers and miners in the trust did not exceed 99.5%. As a result, the "Chelyabkomir" trust failed to implement the state plan for coal mining.

These situations were caused by the lack of non-specialized electricians in the mines, breakdowns and malfunctions of technical mechanisms [8;51-53], as well as the lack of manpower in the trusts. Such cases were mainly observed in mines No. 1 and No. 22 of the trust.

During this period, only 55.2% of coal seams, 50.07% of mines, and 38.23% of pile drivers and miners were able to deliver their production plans.

The "labor soldiers" mobilized from Uzbekistan encountered a number of problems during their work at industrial and construction sites in the Urals region due to their lack of knowledge of relevant technical and safety regulations.

As a result of the climate, domestic life, unfavorable conditions, hard and trying work in foreign lands, more than 150 thousand of our compatriots had to endure the blows of the past. Thanks to their dedicated and hard work, production was focused exclusively on the front, and they made a worthy contribution to the victory over fascism during the Second World War.

The settlement and housing issue of the mobilized labor soldiers in the South Urals has remained a constant problem. Domestic conditions and procedures for workers sent to work in construction and industrial facilities, their reception and accommodation were determined in the decision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs No. 2414.

Thus, the resolution assigned the tasks of timely reception, reception and accommodation of labor soldiers as labor columns to the relevant People's Commissariats, providing appropriate household services, and utilizing their labor in production and construction [9;39].

The workers were housed in barracks-style barracks with a capacity of 200-250 people each, or in numerous cellars. The cellars were made of paired logs, the spaces between the logs were filled with soil, and living quarters with windows were prepared at a depth of 1-1.5 meters underground, at ground level. The roofs of these dwellings were made of wood, consisting of a layer of thatch covered with mud. The number of inhabitants in the cellars was divided according to their size, but the conditions and conditions in the dormitories were not up to standard.

For example, the construction workers of the thermal power plant in Orsk were housed in basements, the dormitories were dirty, even the walls were not plastered, and the dormitory building was not prepared for the winter season at all. In addition, a group of construction workers were housed in unequipped basements until the spring of 1943, and later moved to basements with slightly better living conditions.

The administration of the 257th factory under the People's Commissariat of Ammunition in the spring of 1943 divided the mobilized Central Asian workers into groups of 60 and placed them in the basements. Only in the fall did the plant administration take measures to improve the living conditions of the workers. The laborers were moved to newly built houses and "... were provided with blankets, bedspreads, and underwear, which were changed every ten days. The two-story bunks in the basements were replaced with beds" [10;70] .

In the summer of 1943, workers sent to Construction Department No. 24 under the People's Commissariat of Communications were divided into two sections. Those in Section 1 were housed with other workers in three barracks and two semi-basements, while those in Section 2 were housed in two barracks and five cloth tents.

By December of this year, construction plots No. 5, 6, 7 from Construction Department No. 20 were added to this enterprise. These sections are located around the railway stations, some of them were forced to live in canvas tents, and some of them were forced to live in wagons. Regrettably, according to the information revealed by the studies, the conditions created in these sections were found to be unsatisfactory, and there was not even a bathroom for the labor soldiers living in cold-resistant fabric tents in the bitter winter. There were only two bathrooms for the residents of the basement.

Similar conditions were observed in the 5th section of the Kirov plant, where the barracks and basements where the workers were housed did not have the possibility of heating in the winter due to the lack of fuel and the lack of interior space. Each of the barracks is designed for 360 people, and the basements are dug for 120 and 220 people. The workers slept in wooden and half-timbered bunks. Such cases have caused protests and an increase in the number of sick people.

The administration of Plant No. 701 of the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy in the Chebarkulsky Kurgan created relatively good conditions for the living and recreation of its workers. According to an analysis of April 1943, the workers in the dormitories were provided with 50 tables, 200 bowls, 200 buckets, 50 water containers, 25 kettles, and 50 clothes hangers. There were 15 hand and face wash basins and shower facilities installed in the same place for washing [11;112]. However, the dormitory buildings and basements did not meet sanitary and hygienic requirements, i.e., the roofs were leaking, the ceilings and walls were damaged, and groundwater had seeped onto the floors of some basements.

In 1943, 903 labor servicemen recruited to work at the Chelyabkomir Trust's facilities constituted 65.7% of the total number of workers.

In the same harsh conditions, workers working at mine No. 1 of Korkinokumir and mine No. 5 of Korkinshakstroy lived in barracks with unplastered interiors and no stoves. In mine No. 30, where the miners worked, there was even no drinking

water, as a result of which "...people drank water from small ponds" is recorded in sources [12;14].

As a result, cases of illness, absenteeism and even death were observed. In 1943, 2,813 of 2,968 workers employed by the "Chelyabkomir" trust, i.e. 95%, left the workplace. The fate of most of the escaped workers ended tragically. The bodies of labor soldiers were found in empty wagons that had stopped to load coal.

Some of the mobilized Uzbek workers were also sent to construction and production facilities under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, according to the distribution of the State Committee for the Protection of the Armed Forces. In May 1943, 120 of the mobilized Uzbek workers were sent to the "Domenstroy" construction department, which was part of the "Chelyabmetallurgstroy" camp and construction department of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs [13;32]. Central Asians working in camp section No. 4 of the "Chelyablag" MATL were placed in special barracks and basements.

The camp site where the "labor army men" lived was under the control of the GULAG (Main Directorate of Camps) of the USSR. The area was surrounded by a barbed wire fence, a guard tower was installed along the wall, and there was a guardhouse for entering and exiting. The site was guarded by the USSR military guards.

The "labor army men" were escorted to and from work by a convoy of armed soldiers, including other camp representatives, including Soviet Germans, prisoners, and Wehrmacht prisoners of war. The construction sites of the metallurgical plant were guarded by armed soldiers, and work was carried out in two shifts.

Not only the camp residents, but also the mobilized workers were forbidden to leave the residence and production area alone without a permit.

Separate camp units and communities, such as detachments, columns, brigades, as well as colonies, had an espionage network, and according to July 1944, 97,780 messages were sent through this network [14; 33].

For evading work, attempting to escape from the camp or workplace, labor servicemen and prisoners at the Chelyablag concentration camp are sentenced to 5-10 years in prison and the ultimate punishment - execution.

The investigation was conducted by the Permanent Commission under the Chelyabinsk Regional Court until the fall of 1943, and later by the Military Tribunal of the IKHK troops, which began to operate, and the punishment was imposed [15;43].

The foremen and corporals at the enterprise also affected the physical, moral and spiritual state of the labor army. There were cases of neglect, rude treatment of the workers, and even beatings. In particular, workers living in the labor camps of the city of Magnitogorsk, in their appeals to the party bodies, noted the rude treatment they were subjected to. Also, sources indicate that the senior foreman and corporal in the construction departments No. 5 of the Santekhsstroy and Magnitstroy trusts beat Central Asian workers, the commandant of the dormitory in the workers' barracks of the Magnitstroy trust treated the workers rudely, even taking the money of deceased Central Asian workers, the commander of the 24th construction platoon in

Chelyabinsk used insulting words that offended the workers' national pride, and the corporal of the mechanized column of the same department beat a mobilized worker during work hours [16;73].

None of the 291 Uzbek "labor soldiers" living in the basements of site No. 5 were given sheets and blankets to sleep on, and as a result of the investigation, it was found that 400 of the general workers were actually dressed in rags ("no underwear, completely worn out from the outside"), were not provided with a sufficient amount of soap, and were using special clothes without washing them.

In some cases, workers were forced to work barefoot on construction sites. For example, at the Chkalov Locomotive Repair Plant, most workers did not have blankets or bed sheets, and bricklayers were forced to work barefoot on construction sites without being given new shoes because their shoes were worn out.

During the summer and especially winter months of 1943, the heads of construction and industrial enterprises of the Chkalov region did not fully implement measures to improve the living conditions of workers in the dormitories under their control, including the labor soldiers of the OAO, and did not monitor the fulfillment of orders for the purchase of a sufficient amount of warm clothing and footwear, as well as blankets.

Instead of being polite, compassionate, and caring towards Uzbek patients, medical staff were rude and refused to provide medical services [17; 68].

Conclusion . The conditions in which the Uzbek "labor soldiers" mobilized to the industrial and construction sites of the Southern Urals were kept were not only related to their belonging to a particular people's commissariat. The solution to many problems depended on the capabilities and desires of local authorities, enterprise leaders and administration. One of the party documents devoted to the analysis of the situation of labor soldiers in production concluded the following on issues of supply, problems in production activities and sanitary and household conditions of life. That is, "the failure to resolve the problems by the lower-level individual farms and party leaders led to the emergence of unhealthy moods among the workers, such as their desire to return home at any cost..." [18;17]

In general, the productive work of mobilized workers was not always supported and encouraged. The fate of our compatriots who faced many problems to create normal working conditions is glorious.

The work carried out by the State Duma on the mobilization of Uzbek "labor soldiers" for the country's economy by Resolution No. 2414 is evidenced by the fact that the plan was fulfilled for 167,300 people.

Uzbek "labor soldiers" made a significant contribution to the victory of the Soviet people over fascism, as well as to the development of the Urals economy during and after the war.

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